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The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil release posed the challenges of two types of spill: a familiar spill characterized by buoyant oil, fouling and killing 
organisms at the sea surface and eventually grounding on and damaging sensitive shoreline habitats, and a novel deepwater spill involving many 
unknowns. The subsurface retention of oil as ﬁnely dispersed droplets and emulsions, wellhead injection of dispersants, and deepwater retention 
of plumes of natural gas undergoing rapid microbial degradation were unprecedented and demanded the development of a new model for deep-
water well blowouts that includes subsurface consequences. Existing governmental programs and policies had not anticipated this new theater of 
impacts, which thereby challenged decisionmaking on the spill response, on the assessment of natural resource damages, on the preparation for 
litigation to achieve compensation for public trust losses, and on restoration. Modiﬁcation of laws and policies designed to protect and restore 
ocean resources is needed in order to accommodate oil drilling in the deep sea and other frontiers.
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hydrocarbons escape into the atmosphere with minimal 
residence time in the water column. Organisms that occupy 
or frequently encounter the sea surface, such as ﬂoating 
seabirds, can suffer high mortality rates (Piatt 1991). On 
landfall, this generally cohesive surface oil fouls intertidal 
and shallow subtidal habitats, which degrades ecosystem 
services by killing sensitive organisms, including key provid-
ers of structural habitat, such as salt-marsh macrophytes 
and mangroves (e.g., Jackson et al. 1989). Oil can persist 
when it is buried in anoxic, nutrient-limited sediments, 
where weathering is inhibited (Boufadel et al. 2010), leading 
to chronic biological exposures that can reduce production 
(Culbertson et al. 2008, Michel et al. 2009) or reproductive 
output and indirectly suppress the population recovery 
of exposed animals for decades (Teal and Howarth 1984, 
Bodkin et al. 2002, Culbertson et al. 2007, Esler and Iverson 
2010) by depressing their ﬁtness (Peterson 2001, Rice et al. 
2001).
In stark contrast, the DWH blowout occurred in deep 
(1500m) offshore waters, where a highly turbulent discharge 
of hot, pressurized oil and gas entrained cold seawater under 
T
he Deepwater Horizon (DWH) well blowout in the Gulf of 
Mexico represents a tale of two spills: the traditional 
shore-bound surface spill and the novel deep-ocean persis-
tence of intrusions of ﬁnely dispersed (atomized) oil, gas, 
and dispersants. The discharge of oil and gas under high 
pressure at 1500-meter (m) water depth makes the DWH 
incident categorically different from all previous well-
studied crude oil releases into the sea. Implementation of 
legislatively mandated natural resource damage assessment 
(NRDA) revealed serious gaps in the baseline information 
on deep-sea communities, their functioning, and their eco-
toxicological vulnerability, which demonstrates a need to 
modify the laws and policies intended to sustain ecosystem 
services that are at risk from oil and gas drilling.
Before the DWH incident, the prevailing scientiﬁc model 
(ﬁgure 1a) of maritime oil behavior, fate, and exposure 
pathways and the consequent impacts on natural resources 
reﬂected a synthetic understanding of historical oil spills 
as occurring typically on the surface or in shallow, near-
shore waters (NRC 2003). In traditional spills, crude oil 
rises rapidly to or remains at the sea surface, and gaseous 
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high pressures and produced a variety of dispersed phases, 
including small oil droplets, gas bubbles, oil–gas emulsions, 
and gas hydrates. An injection of 0.77 million gallons of 
chemical dispersants at the wellhead, beginning 24 days 
after the well blowout, also contributed to the dispersion 
of the oil (Federal Interagency Solutions Group 2010). The 
collective buoyancy of the oil and gas created a rising plume, 
but unlike a continuous-phase (e.g., sewage) plume, much 
of the oil and gas separated from the entrained seawater 
as it apparently became trapped by depth-related physical 
discontinuities and was deﬂected laterally by ambient cur-
rents (Socolofsky et al. 2011). The dissolution into seawater 
of water-soluble petroleum compounds, including most of 
the methane, ethane, and propane and large fractions of 
water-soluble aromatic compounds, explains the elevated 
levels of petroleum hydrocarbons retained in the subsur-
face plume at a water depth of 1100 m (Reddy et al. 2012). 
A plume of hydrocarbon-enriched waters was observed 
by others at depths of 800–1200 m (Camilli et al. 2010, 
Valentine etal. 2010, Joye etal. 2011), at which hydrocarbons 
stimulated intense heterotrophic microbial activity (Kessler 
et al. 2011) and may have entered deep-sea food chains 
through pelagic primary consumers (as was exhibited by 
nearshore incorporation in mesozooplankton of petroleum 
carbon from DWH oil; Graham WM et al. 2010). The occur-
rence of a deepwater spill of this magnitude and with these 
characteristics is unprecedented and clearly warrants a 
new conceptual oil spill model (ﬁgure 1b). Although about 
half of the 4.9 million barrels of DWH oil did rise to the 
sea surface (Federal Interagency Solutions Group 2010), it 
became weathered during ascent, such that the oil reaching 
the surface appeared reddish-brown in color and was less 
cohesive than crude oil discharged onto the surface would 
be (ﬁgure 1a, 1b). Liquid oil droplets enriched with denser 
compounds, such as asphaltenes, descended toward the 
seaﬂoor (Reddy et al. 2012). In addition, the process of the 
agglomeration of oil particles, sediments, drilling muds, and 
marine snow (detritus falling through the water column), 
mediated by adhesive bacterial exudates (Hazen et al. 2010), 
also triggered oil transport to the seaﬂoor, where deposition 
of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon–enriched particulates 
appears to be associated with the death of hard- and soft-
bottom invertebrates (ﬁgure 1b; Fisher 2010, Joye et al. 
2011).
Although the DWH disaster breaks the prevailing mold of 
traditional shallow-water spills, the international petroleum 
industry has already transferred the focus of its marine 
exploration and production activities to deep (i.e., greater 
than 305 m) and ultradeep (i.e., greater than 500 m) ﬁelds, 
especially in the Gulf of Mexico, as nearshore shallow-water 
reservoirs have become depleted (Graham B et al. 2011). 
This redirection of ocean drilling in the oil and gas indus-
try underscores the urgency to elaborate further details of 
the new oil spill model as a policy priority to prepare for 
future risk assessments and well blowouts (Jernelov 2010). 
Evaluating how massive the impacts of organic carbon load-
ing, the taxon-dependent toxicity of multiple hydrocarbons 
and dispersants, and physical fouling are on a poorly under-
stood pelagic and benthic deepwater ecosystem requires an 
enhanced scientiﬁc understanding.
The unexpected aspects and unknowns associated with 
deepwater ecosystems and the high-pressure petroleum 
releases during the DWH well blowout posed unanticipated 
challenges to the governmental response, which was dictated 
by federal legislation based on experience arising from tra-
ditional oil spills. In the United States, the Oil Pollution Act 
(OPA) of 1990 articulates policies that specify collaboration 
among federal, state, and tribal governments, together with 
the parties responsible for the oil spill, to assess impacts 
and achieve restoration. A sequence of actions implements 
those policies in the process known as NRDA (see Alexander 
2010). NRDA is intended to achieve the following: (a) a
minimization of environmental injury through emergency 
responses; (b) the use of defensible science to quantify dam-
ages to natural resources and their ecosystem and human 
services; (c) the provision through negotiation or litigation 
Figure 1. Contrast of (a) the traditional model for crude 
oil fate and effects that prevailed before the Deepwater 
Horizon (DWH) blowout, based on synthesis of experience 
with nearshore maritime spills in shallow water, and (b) the 
newly emerging and still-developing model of a deepwater 
blowout like the DWH spill. Abbreviation: m, meters.www.biosciencemag.org May 2012 / Vol. 62 No. 5  s  "IO3CIENCE        
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corresponding NRDA policies to include the opportunity 
for the rapid funding of scientiﬁc studies of spill response.
The emergency responses (e.g., Lovett 2010) following 
the DWH blowout were diverse and applied intensively 
and extensively. Each response action that was taken had 
the potential to cause collateral biological injuries (table 1), 
many of which were conﬁrmed by observations, even if they 
were not quantiﬁed by rigorous sampling designs. The most 
pervasive responses were applications of 1.07 million gallons 
of dispersants onto the sea surface and the unprecedented 
injection of 0.77 million gallons of dispersants directed 
toward petroleum jets escaping from the wellhead. The deci-
sion to employ dispersants on this scale involved evaluating 
trade-offs (NRC 2005, Federal Interagency Solutions Group 
2010) and remains contentious, despite prior approval by 
the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and 
endorsement by a workshop of experts held weeks after 
the spill began. Dispersants were applied to weathered oil 
(mousse) at the sea surface during windy days with sufﬁcient 
surface mixing to be effective, whereas on calm days, when 
dispersants are largely ineffective (Fingas 2001), mechanical 
skimming was the response of choice. Nevertheless, much 
dispersant still remained in near-surface waters from the 
previous applications during windier conditions, and much 
persisted with a long half-life in the deep sea (Kujawinski 
et al. 2011). The turbulent mixing induced by the pressur-
ized discharge of hot oil and gas into entrained cold seawater 
was sufﬁcient by itself to induce massive dispersion of oil 
into ﬁne droplets; the dissolution of water-soluble hydro-
carbons; and the creation of emulsions of oil, gas, water, 
and gas hydrates (Johansen et al. 2003, Federal Interagency 
Solutions Group 2010). Examination of the BP videos sug-
gests that dispersant injection at the wellhead may not have 
consistently delivered the chemicals into the turbulent oil 
plume, which renders its efﬁcacy uncertain (Kujawinski 
et al. 2011). Consequently, the chosen response of disper-
sant application now credited with successfully dispersing 
the DWH oil (Federal Interagency Solutions Group 2010) 
may have only marginally augmented the high degree of 
natural oil dispersion while elevating biological exposures 
to toxicants. The USEPA conducted new tests of the acute, 
short-term toxicity to two standard laboratory test organ-
isms for dispersants used or considered for use in DWH spill 
response and of combinations of dispersants and Louisiana 
sweet crude oil and conﬁrmed only modest toxicity (Hemmer 
et al. 2011). Subsequent NRDA research projects are now 
addressing dispersants and dispersed oil toxicity following 
chronic exposures of pelagic organisms more representa-
tive of those exposed to dispersed oil in the ocean after the 
DWH spill. Such rigorous scientiﬁc tests of the presumed 
beneﬁts and harms of feasible response alternatives must 
be conducted on other response actions (table 1) in order 
to facilitate informed policy decisions on future responses. 
In the absence of available funds provided through the OPA 
for conducting rapid ﬁeld testing of response consequences, 
the opportunity following the DWH spill to collect rigorous 
of a ﬁnancial settlement sufﬁcient to achieve compensatory 
restoration; and then (d) the implementation of restora-
tion projects designed to replace losses of natural resources 
and of ecosystem services. The report of the presidential 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling (Graham B et al. 2011) documented 
many policy failings of the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS; now split into two independent agencies: the Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management, and the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement), including, for example, the 
agency’s failure to require in advance of deepwater drilling 
approval that drillers demonstrate the availability of tested 
technologies to terminate a deepwater blowout. Here, we 
document how and why the NRDA process is challenged 
by a well blowout in the deep sea and, by extension, other 
unfamiliar pollution events at environmental frontiers.
Emergency response
When a major oil release is detected, responders face difﬁcult 
decisions on whether to choose or reject possible response 
actions. These choices are made by carefully weighing the 
potential beneﬁts of the intervention against possible collateral 
harm, with the realization that intervention could cause more 
harm than good (Ritchie 1995). Assessing such trade-offs is 
made difﬁcult by imperfect knowledge (Anastas et al. 2010) 
of both the effectiveness of the intervention and the risk of 
unintended damages. Mesocosm and laboratory experiments 
can provide useful insights, and some compelling experimen-
tal test designs have been developed and applied in the ﬁeld 
following oil spills. For example, Mearns (1996) described the 
results of experiments in which the consequences of applying 
pressurized washing to oiled rocky intertidal communities 
fouled by Exxon Valdez oil were tested and that revealed that 
pressurized hot-water washing induces greater macroalgal 
and invertebrate mortality than the oiling itself.
Despite this advance in understanding the risks of pressur-
ized washing of oiled rocky shores, during the 22 years since 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill, further progress in understand-
ing the relative beneﬁts and risks of harm for emergency 
interventions applicable to DWH spill response decisions 
has been limited. The major impediment to advancing 
such understanding is the failure of the existing policies 
and legislation to provide immediately accessible funding 
at the time of a major spill to support rigorous assessments 
of spill responses. The Mearns (1996) study, which serves 
as a model of capitalizing on the opportunities offered by 
a major spill, was funded outside the NRDA process by a 
government-monitoring program. Making use of opportu-
nities for ﬁeld testing of response effectiveness and for quan-
tifying potential harm as a function of varying conditions 
should be included as an integral function of the NRDA 
process, so as to leave a legacy of enhanced preparedness in 
advance of the next oil spill. Providing sufﬁcient funding for 
scientiﬁc studies of response effects could be incorporated 
into a revision of the OPA through, for example, expand-
ing the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and modifying the    "IO3CIENCE  s  May 2012 / Vol. 62 No. 5 www.biosciencemag.org
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scientiﬁc information to guide future responses may well be 
lost. Collateral injuries to public trust resources caused by 
even well-justiﬁed response interventions require compen-
satory restoration under the OPA (Alexander 2010), which 
provides more incentive to support scientiﬁc assessments in 
advance of emergency decisionmaking.
Natural resource damage assessment
NRDA is not a scientiﬁc endeavor but, rather, a legally driven 
process that employs science as the vehicle to achieve the 
quantiﬁcation of injury and to obtain funds for compen-
satory restoration. For a familiar shallow-water oil spill, 
NRDA works well because of the large numbers of pre-
cedent shallow-water spills that guide injury assessments 
and frame restoration. The novelty, however, of the DWH 
blowout produced unprecedented scientiﬁc challenges to 
prevailing ecotoxicological and oceanographic models, as 
well as to the limited ecological understanding of deep-
water and deep benthic habitats and their functioning (e.g., 
Schrope 2011). This limited the capacity to initiate a timely 
and complete program of natural resource injury assess-
ments. In addition, the OPA process requires cooperative 
decisionmaking between the governmental trustee organi-
zations and the responsible party and mutual approvals of 
NRDA studies if the studies are to be funded up front by 
the responsible party. The legislative requirement for this 
collaboration in decisionmaking slows down the NRDA 
process and inﬂuences the choice and limits the scope of 
NRDA studies that are conducted. Government trustees can 
decide to use public funds within governmental agencies 
to support studies with which the responsible party does 
not concur, but this step is discouraged by the OPA policy 
of collaboration and by serious budgetary limitations. The 
MMS, the responsible federal oversight agency, could have 
required more-complete scientiﬁc studies of the ecology of 
the deep pelagic ocean and risks posed by ﬁnely dispersed 
oil at depth, but MMS did not possess or provide enough 
funding to ensure adequate preparation for deepwater 
blowouts (Graham B et al. 2011). The need to enhance our 
understanding of novel oil and gas behavior, such as that 
associated with the DWH oil spill, could in part have been 
anticipated from prescient ﬁeld (Johansen et al. 2003) and 
laboratory (Socolofsky and Adams 2002) experiments. It is 
unclear why these studies failed to lead to the development 
of a new model of deepwater risks, but lax oversight by MMS 
and the complacency of both the regulators and the industry 
played a role (Graham B et al. 2011).
Several serious gaps in scientiﬁc understanding exist that 
inhibited the capacity of the NRDA process to determine the 
ecosystem impacts of the DWH well blowout and that may 
have prevented the collection of the information necessary 
to detail all the important damages to the deepwater pelagic 
and benthic resources and their ecosystem functions. First, 
detailed understanding of the physicochemical behavior of 
oil, gas, and dispersants when they are released under the 
environmental conditions that prevailed at the wellhead is 
incomplete. Second, knowledge of the transport and fate 
of oil and gas depends on the challenging task of coupling 
dynamic changes in buoyancy with accurate, real-time, 
three-dimensional physical circulation models of the ocean. 
Table 1. Examples of intended beneﬁts and potential collateral injuries from response actions following the Deepwater 
Horizon oil release. Research is needed to quantify effectiveness and beneﬁts as well as collateral injuries to improve 
decisionmaking on responses to future oil spills.
Response Intended beneﬁts Collateral injuries
Surface oil burning Oil removal from the ocean Health impacts to humans and wildlife from atmospheric soot and toxic 
organics such as dioxins; ash deposition on sea ﬂoor
Oil skimming Oil removal from the ocean Skimming up and killing sea-surface organisms
Berm construction Blockage of oil from reaching natural 
shoreline habitats of high value
Dredging and ﬁlling that kills benthic invertebrates (prey of crabs, shrimps, 
and demersal ﬁshes); luring sea turtles and shorebirds to nest on unstable, 
eroding berm shores
Beach excavation The removal of buried oil and tar balls Killing intertidal invertebrates (prey of surf ﬁshes, crabs, and shorebirds); 
removing wrack (habitat of invertebrate prey for shorebirds); disturbing 
sensitive shorebird and seabird nesting areas by vehicular trafﬁc on 
beaches; running over shorebird chicks
Sea turtle nest relocation The transport of eggs away from Gulf 
beaches at risk of oiling
Risking imprinting of surviving female sea turtles to return to nest on a 
different coast, thereby reducing Gulf populations
Boom deployment Prevention of oil from reaching marshes 
and other sensitive habitats
Physically damaging the marsh when booms break loose and waves drive 
them into the marsh; trapping of waterbirds in oiled areas
Freshwater diversion Oil kept offshore and away from 
sensitive marsh habitat through 
manipulation of river ﬂows
Killing oysters over wide areas by reducing salinity; introduction of 
Mississippi River contaminants, including excessive nutrients to marshes; 
modifying ﬁsh distributions
Dispersant addition at 
the sea surface and 
at the wellhead
Dispersion of oil into ﬁne droplets to 
accelerate its degradation by enhancing 
microbial access; a reduction of the 
volume of oil reaching the sea surface 
and grounding on shoreline habitats
Adding another toxin to the sea; exposing marine organisms to more 
biologically available dispersed oil and dispersants (Corexit in two 
formulations), risking widespread mortality of pelagic and benthic 
organisms, as well as food web and ecosystem impacts; exposing human 
oil responders and wildlife to health riskswww.biosciencemag.org May 2012 / Vol. 62 No. 5  s  "IO3CIENCE        
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Third, quantitative measures of the dispersion of oil into 
ﬁne droplets and the creation of subsurface oil–gas–water–
gas-hydrate emulsions that, to some degree, resulted in 
seaﬂoor deposition (Joye et al. 2011, Reddy et al. 2012) are 
needed in order to depict the fate of the released hydro-
carbons and the extent of biological exposures. Such dis-
persion and subsurface retention of hydrocarbons probably 
accelerates microbial degradation (Kujawinski et al. 2011) 
yet simultaneously enhances exposure and magniﬁes injury 
to animals of the deep-sea water column and seaﬂoor. 
Fourth, consequences for at-risk functional groups, such 
as particle feeders, are unclear, particularly at mesopelagic 
and bathypelagic depths, where baseline community char-
acterization and functional biology are poorly documented. 
The taxon-speciﬁc toxicity (Lenihan et al. 2003) of hydro-
carbons and dispersants must also be integrated into the 
understanding of biological oceanographic processes. The 
potentially important indirect and delayed consequences 
(Peterson et al. 2003) of impacts may include reductions in 
particle ﬁltration capacity and prey availability to higher-
order consumers (Hawkins and Southward 1992). Finally, 
the large subsidy of ﬁxed carbon to the ocean ecosystem 
and the stimulation of heterotrophic microbial production 
present a conceptual challenge to biological oceanography. 
Microbially mediated biogeochemical cycling and the pro-
duction of microbial biomass in the deep sea have yet to be 
fully integrated into our understanding of carbon ﬂows into 
food webs that support the larger marine animals that are 
most valued by people.
Acknowledging that the greatest uncertainty over DWH 
spill injuries to natural resources arises from an incom-
plete appreciation of the new components of the oil 
spill model associated with deep subsurface oil fate and 
impacts (Schrope 2011), we examined how two federal 
rapid-response research programs allocated effort among 
habitats. We explicitly questioned how the study effort in 
each program was distributed among those habitats that 
were expected to have borne the brunt of the injuries on 
the basis of the traditional, shallow-water oil spill model 
versus those poorly characterized deepwater habitats that 
were also expected to be affected under the emerging 
deepwater blowout model (ﬁgure 1). The two funding 
programs are the initial set of NSF-funded Grants for 
Rapid Response Research (RAPID grants) and the initial 
set of oil spill NRDA damage assessment studies. Effort 
was estimated by total numbers of grants and fractions of 
grants allocated for studying a habitat. Each RAPID and 
NRDA project was scored for all habitats included in the 
study; the scores for grants covering more than one habitat 
were weighted (adjusted) by dividing by the number of 
habitats (e.g., a study that included ﬁve different habitats 
would be allocated 0.20 for each habitat, whereas a study 
that included only one habitat would be allocated 1.00 for 
that habitat). Using dollars spent as an alternative metric 
would not alter the general patterns for NSF RAPID grants 
because they were capped at a ﬁxed maximum cost. Costs 
of NRDA studies in the initial round were unavailable for 
analogous assessment. Habitats studied were determined 
from project summaries.
We ﬁrst separated the environment into 12 separate 
habitats (5 shoreline habitats, 4 pelagic habitats covering 
different depth ranges in the water column, and 3 benthic 
habitats differing by seaﬂoor depth; ﬁgure 2). For each of 
two scenarios (a composite of diverse shallow-water oil spills 
and a deepwater blowout under high pressure), we estimated 
the relative degree of expected ecological impact by habitat. 
Expected ecological impact in each habitat (ﬁgure 2a) was
estimated as extent × (intensity + recovery time), where 
the extent was categorized as 0 (<1% of habitat affected), 
1 (1%–10% affected), 2 (11%–50% affected), or 3 (>50% 
affected); intensity (a function of dose and sensitivity) was 
categorized as 0 (none), 1 (<10% mortality), 2 (11%–50% 
mortality) or 3 (>50% mortality); and recovery time was 
categorized as 0 (less than 1 month), 1 (1 month to 1 year), 
2 (1–5 years) or 3 (>5 years). These categorizations were 
established by consensus of all of the authors.
The results are intended to provide a semiquantitative 
template of how impact study effort might be expected to 
be reallocated away from shoreline habitats and into the 
deep pelagic and benthic habitats, assuming study efforts 
should be proportional to the anticipated severity of ecolog-
ical impacts. A shift in the distribution of ecological effects 
among habitats is evident in ﬁgure 2a, with the expected 
severity of impacts shifting from shallow sea surface and 
marsh and mangrove habitats to deep water and benthic 
habitats. Both the NSF RAPID (ﬁgure 2b) and the NRDA 
(ﬁgure 2c) allocations of study effort reveal only a modest 
shift towards more subsurface pelagic investigation than 
would have been allocated for traditional shallow-water oil 
spills but very low effort allocated to benthic habitats at any 
ocean depth. One explanation for the retention of relatively 
high assessment effort on sea-surface and shoreline impacts 
is that ecosystem and human services are known to be high 
for these habitats, yet are relatively unknown or unappreci-
ated in the deep sea. In addition, the limited availability 
of specialized research platforms such as minisubs, ROVs 
(remotely operated vehicles), and oceanographic vessels 
constrained scientiﬁc research capacity to launch more 
benthic studies in deep waters in response to the blowout. 
The degree to which the ocean science community did 
respond to put people and equipment in place, albeit with 
inadequate funding and gaps in scope, was actually quite 
remarkable.
Much more research is needed to provide the scientiﬁc 
capacity to assess impacts of deepwater blowouts. Pursuing 
such research will prove costly, complex, and demanding of 
limited research platforms and technology. Assessing impacts 
acting through food web modiﬁcations, persistence of toxi-
cants, and biogeochemical transformations may require 
relatively long time frames as lagged indirect effects play out 
over multiple years (e.g., Peterson et al. 2003, Culbertson 
et al. 2008). Multiyear investments in research do not ﬁt    "IO3CIENCE  s  May 2012 / Vol. 62 No. 5 www.biosciencemag.org
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comfortably within the traditional NRDA practices under 
the OPA, which contemplates familiar, more-accessible 
ecosystems of shallow waters and shorelines, where tradi-
tional approaches may sufﬁce. A failure to take advantage of 
the DWH disaster as a massive, unplanned, and otherwise 
indefensible experiment would represent a missed oppor-
tunity to understand ecological and societal implications 
of this and future deepwater blowouts. Distributions of 
effort by two federal programs in assessing injury to natural 
resources (ﬁgure 2) do not suggest that sufﬁcient attention 
was initially given to determining the fate of oil retained 
in the deep ocean or its impacts on deep water-column or 
benthic resources and basic ecosystem processes. Even if 
more effort were directed to these poorly known systems, the 
delay in committing to deepwater impact assessments may 
mean that the ecosystem response signals have been muted 
or masked, in which case, the full impacts of the subsurface 
retention of oil, gas, and dispersants will remain unknown 
and underestimated. Because of the potential scope of these 
deep-ocean impacts and the knowledge that oil and gas pro-
duction has now shifted into the deep sea, the inability of 
the NRDA process to handle new scientiﬁc uncertainties on 
the scale exposed by the DWH disaster should not be used 
to justify a continuing failure to study and document deep-
ocean injuries, which could perhaps be included as a part of 
a restoration project.
Implications for and of litigation
Strong incentives exist within the NRDA process for rapid 
settlement of monetary claims by governmental trustees of 
natural resources even before long-term direct and indirect 
damages may have been recognized (Peterson 2001, Peterson 
et al. 2003, Culbertson et al. 2007, 2008, Michel et al. 2009). 
Out-of-court settlements eliminate the high costs of trials, 
lead to earlier public disclosure of the types and magnitudes 
of damages discovered, and accelerate the implementation 
of compensatory restoration. Adopting a policy promoting 
efﬁcient resolution of injury claims and reaching speedy 
settlement, however, may render moot the completion of the 
novel oil spill oceanography studies necessary to character-
ize the variety, scope, magnitude, and signiﬁcance of deep-
water impacts of the DWH spill. Compensation would then 
be based on a subset of natural resource damages, short-
changing restoration of injured resources and diminishing 
capacity to anticipate and model likely risks and damages 
from future spills. Consequently, trustee decisionmakers 
face challenging trade-offs over whether to settle with the 
responsible parties quickly or only after delayed impacts 
have been revealed. Ideally, a quick settlement should 
include a reopener clause that can be activated and that 
speciﬁes time limits for resolving reopener claims (unlike 
the restrictive conditions associated with the Exxon Valdez
reopener; Alexander 2010), allowing compensation for inju-
ries not yet recognized (striking the Exxon Valdez words “and 
not reasonably anticipated”) at the time of settlement. It is 
hard to imagine a set of circumstances under which a more 
a
b
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Figure 2. (a) Contrast of distributions of anticipated 
ecological effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill among 
habitats under the old model (blue) and as realized under 
the newly evolving model (i.e., reality; red). Each ray of 
the diagram represents one habitat (B, benthic; WC, water 
column), with the distance from the center proportional to 
the projected impact. (b) Distribution of initial National 
Science Foundation RAPID awards among habitats, 
including all RAPID awards (blue), which includes studies 
of oil fate and other issues not directly related to spill 
effects, and only those awards focusing on ecological effects 
of the spill (green). Each ray of the diagram represents 
one habitat, with the distance from the center equal to the 
weighted total number of grants studying that habitat. 
(c) Distribution of initial government trustee-sponsored 
natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) studies 
among different habitats, including all NRDA studies 
(blue), some of which did not address habitat-explicit 
issues, and only those studies focused on the ecological 
effects of the spill (green). Each ray of the diagram 
represents one habitat, with the distance from the center 
equal to the weighted total number of studies of that 
habitat. Abbreviations: cm, centimeters; m, meters.www.biosciencemag.org May 2012 / Vol. 62 No. 5  s  "IO3CIENCE        
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incomplete understanding of functioning and vulnerability 
to spilled oil exists than the deep-sea ecosystem affected by 
the DWH incident.
Restoration incapacity
Without completing studies of ecological functioning of 
deep-sea systems and pelagic and benthic impacts in the 
deep ocean, many natural resource impacts of the DWH 
blowout would probably remain unknown. These gaps 
in knowledge jeopardize reasonable implementation of 
compensatory restoration of those injured resources. The 
presently limited scientiﬁc appreciation of deep-sea food 
webs could lead to a conclusion that the biogeochemi-
cal interventions induced by massive injection of oil, gas, 
and dispersants into the deep sea and the mortalities of 
particle feeders from exposures to dispersed oil did not 
degrade delivery of ocean ecosystem services of value to 
humans. We view such a conclusion as presently unjusti-
ﬁed. For example, 14   species protected under US laws and 
39 more International Union for Conservation of Nature 
Red List species routinely use the spill area (Campagna 
et al. 2011), including sperm whales feeding on squid and 
other prey at depths as great as 1500 m. Such uses raise 
critical questions about whether the spill affected these 
valued species at risk by breaking the food chain links to 
particle feeders and thus to even higher trophic levels. 
Answers to such questions would educate present and 
future policymakers on the value of sustaining the integ-
rity of deep-ocean functions and potential spill impacts on 
those processes. Conducting extensive science on deep-sea 
natural processes and on injuries to them does not ﬁt into 
the narrow scope and short time frames of typical NRDA-
driven damage assessment studies. Consequently, policy—
and perhaps legislation (e.g., in the OPA)—changes are 
necessary to accommodate these needs and analogous 
events that were not anticipated from the composite model 
of familiar oil spills. One possible source of funding for 
these investigations could be restoration settlement funds, 
because the completion of compensatory restoration of 
the deep-sea damages is impossible without ﬁrst knowing 
the extent of those damages. Compensatory restorations 
could include creating downward ﬂuxes of natural organic 
particles by fertilizing the oligotrophic ocean surface with 
phosphate or by enhancing the Sargassum-associated com-
munity of ﬁsh and invertebrates by preventing commercial 
Sargassum harvests and by the introduction of cultured 
Sargassum—in each case, augmenting the downward ﬂuxes 
of natural organic particles to particle feeders below. Either 
a failure to assess deep-sea injury or a failure to implement 
novel deep-sea restoration would induce partial restoration 
incapacity.
Implications for changing legislation and government 
policies
The ongoing implementation of NRDA in response to 
the DWH blowout is exposing critical information gaps, 
which collectively challenge the effective conduct of each 
successive phase of NRDA. NRDA depends on the preex-
istence of an adequate scientiﬁc understanding to produce 
compensatory restoration for lost resources and their 
ecosystem and human services. The scope and signiﬁcance 
of the information gaps demonstrate that existing govern-
ment programs and policies created to enforce key provi-
sions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
were inadequate to protect natural resources and their 
services from oil spill injury arising in the deep ocean. 
Despite explicit requests by MMS for enhanced funding to 
conduct scientiﬁc tests of effectiveness and risks of alter-
native spill responses, Congress repeatedly failed to deliver 
sufﬁcient support. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act (OCSLA) explicitly excluded the central and western 
Gulf of Mexico from the otherwise universal requirement 
to produce a development and production plan, which 
thereby reduced the levels of environmental review of 
oil-and-gas plans that are required elsewhere and which 
allowed deepwater drilling to proceed in those areas with-
out the need for the information gathering that would 
allow a full assessment of risks (Graham B et al. 2011). The 
OPA was developed in 1990 to guide the NRDA process, 
but it used the Exxon Valdez oil spill for its model of risks 
of oil spill injuries and failed to anticipate the legitimate 
science needs and risks to environmental resources and 
their services in new frontiers such as deep water. This 
focus led to a failure to endorse the need for and to fund 
sufﬁcient ecological, physical, and socioeconomic study 
to support an accurate risk assessment and to implement 
NRDA in frontier conditions that differ from the expecta-
tions of the traditional model. The OCSLA provides only 
30 days for the US Department of the Interior (DOI) to 
complete a review of any exploration plan duly submitted 
by a leaseholder in the outer continental shelf of the Gulf. 
This time is insufﬁcient to conduct an environmental 
impact study or even an environmental assessment, and 
therefore, the legislated short review time represents an 
implicit policy of encouraging a superﬁcial environmental 
review, which would minimize the creation and use of sci-
entiﬁc information on ecosystem risks (Alexander 2010). 
Through internal management decisions, since 1981, the 
DOI has exercised its option under the OCSLA to grant 
categorical exclusions to relieve most Gulf of Mexico 
drilling plans from NEPA review requirements (Graham 
B et al. 2011). For deep water, this practice would appear 
to violate the condition that most categorical exclusions 
must meet—namely, that even under the worst conditions, 
no negative environmental impacts would be expected. 
Although policy and legislative shortcomings have already 
led to inadequate information to facilitate a comprehen-
sive NRDA in deep water after the DWH blowout, policy 
and legislative changes are still needed in advance of oil 
drilling in any frontier region, such as the Arctic, where 
the familiar oil spill model is also insufﬁcient to guide 
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